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ABSTRACT
The economics profession in general, and 
economic forecasters in particular, have faced 
some understandable criticism for their failure 
to predict the timing and severity of the recent 
economic crisis. In this paper, we offer some 
assessment of the performance of the Economic 
Analysis conducted at the ECB both in the run up 
to and since the onset of the crisis.  Drawing on 
this assessment, we then offer some indications 
of how the analysis of economic developments 
could be improved looking forward. The 
key priorities identiﬁ   ed include the need to: 
i) extend existing tools and/or develop new tools 
to account for important feedback mechanisms, 
for instance, improved real-ﬁ  nancial  linkages 
and non-linear dynamics; ii) develop ways to 
handle the complexity arising from the presence 
of multiple models and alternative economic 
paradigms; and iii) given the limitations of point 
forecasts, to further develop risk and scenario 
analysis around baseline projections.
KEY WORDS: EURO AREA, FINANCIAL 
CRISIS, MACRO ECONOMIC FORECASTING
JEL CLASSIFICATION: E02, E30, E2, C535
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This paper draws on the experiences during 
the run up to, and since the onset of, the recent 
ﬁ  nancial crisis to offer some indications of how 
the analysis of economic developments could be 
improved. In the ﬁ  rst section, the paper recalls 
the key economic and ﬁ  nancial drivers of the 
crisis, highlighting the role of ﬁ  nancial shocks 
linked to the re-pricing of risk, asset prices 
and  ﬁ   nancing costs. A number of important 
non-ﬁ   nancial elements are also emphasised, 
such as conﬁ  dence and uncertainty shocks and 
deepening international linkages. 
In Section 2, the predictive failure of 
macroeconomic tools and expert judgement 
widely shared by institutional and private 
forecasters alike (as reﬂ   ected in the 
macroeconomic projections in speciﬁ  c periods 
strongly impacted by the crisis) is documented 
for both short and medium-term horizons. 
One of the main conclusions to be drawn from 
the analysis here is that the errors made by 
forecasters largely relate to the size of the shocks 
impacting the economy. Nevertheless, economic 
tools and models as well as expert judgement 
also failed to identify the importance and 
strength of key transmission and ampliﬁ  cation 
channels, especially those linked to ﬁ  nancial 
markets and uncertainty. 
Hence, the third section of our paper identiﬁ  es 
a number of factors which, with the beneﬁ  t of 
hindsight, could have received more attention 
from those conducting economic analysis 
during the period of crisis. These include 
the leading indicator properties of various 
ﬁ  nancial variables, the prevalence of the non-
linear dynamics often neglected in economic 
tools and the signalling aspect of conﬁ  dence 
and uncertainty indicators. In addition, there 
would appear to be a case for relying more on 
judgement than on the results of mechanical 
tools, particularly in the immediate aftermath 
of unprecedented events (such as the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008).  
Lastly, in the ﬁ   nal section of the paper, we 
identify a possible way forward, particularly in 
respect of the main priorities for developing the 
economic analysis. The key priorities identiﬁ  ed 
include the need to: i) extend existing tools and/
or develop new tools to account for important 
aspects, for instance, improved real-ﬁ  nancial 
linkages and non-linear dynamics; ii) develop 
ways to handle the complexity arising from the 
presence of multiple models and alternative 
economic paradigms; and iii) given the 
limitations of point forecasts, to further develop 
risk and scenario analysis around baseline 
projections.6
ECB
Occasional Paper No 130
October 2011
1 INTRODUCTION 
Economists, both those inside and outside 
policy institutions, pay considerable attention to 
analysing conjunctural economic developments. 
This helps them to better understand the current 
state of the economy and to make predictions 
about future developments. The analysis of 
economic developments forms a key element of 
the stability-oriented monetary policy strategy 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) aimed at 
achieving price stability.1 More speciﬁ  cally, 
the economic analysis provides a forward-
looking perspective on the outlook for and risks 
to price stability over the short to medium-term 
and therefore complements, and can be cross-
checked with, an analysis of monetary 
developments that is particularly suited to 
explaining the evolution of price developments 
in the medium to long run.2
In this paper, we focus on the approaches 
adopted for analysing the economic conjuncture 
and attempt to draw out some key lessons 
from the experiences made during the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. Although we concentrate on the methods 
widely used in central banks and international 
organisations, the conclusions reached are also 
likely to be relevant for all those engaged in 
conjunctural analysis. 
In contrast to monetary analysis, economic 
analysis can be characterised as focusing largely 
on models that are based on an assessment 
of economic variables and, in particular, the 
interplay between demand and supply in goods 
and labour markets. In the context of the ECB, 
an important part of the insights emerging 
from the economic analysis is summarised 
in the regular macroeconomic projections of 
Eurosystem and ECB staff which are published 
each year in June and December and in March 
and September, respectively. 
The economic analysis also incorporates 
ﬁ  nancial information to the extent that it is 
relevant for this assessment. Needless to say, 
such information proved to be a key part of the 
economic analysis during the crisis, where there 
was a clear tendency for ﬁ   nancial shocks to 
have an impact on the “real” demand and supply 
for goods and services and also for additional 
feedback effects from developments in the real 
economy to the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
Given the important challenges posed by the 
ﬁ   nancial crisis to the economic analysis, it 
now seems timely to take a step back and try 
to assess what possible insight can be gleaned 
from the performance of the economic analysis 
during the run-up to and since the onset of the 
crisis, and to already offer some indications as 
to how it may be improved in the light of our 
recent experience. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the ﬁ  rst 
section, we recall the key economic and ﬁ  nancial 
drivers of the crisis, highlighting the role of 
ﬁ  nancial shocks linked to risk re-pricing, asset 
prices and ﬁ  nancing costs for both ﬁ  rms and 
households. In addition, a number of important 
non-ﬁ   nancial elements are also emphasised, 
such as conﬁ   dence and uncertainty shocks, 
inventory adjustment as well as more intensive 
international linkages generated via trade. 
In Section 2, the poor performance of 
macroeconomic tools and expert judgement, as 
reﬂ  ected in the macroeconomic projections of 
the crisis period, is documented for both short 
and medium-term horizons. More importantly, 
we note that the large deterioration in the 
accuracy of macroeconomic forecasts was 
This two-pillar approach has proved very successful, both as  1 
a device for processing and introducing a large set of complex 
and diverse information and for structuring the presentation of 
the factors underpinning the monetary policy decisions of the 
Governing Council. In particular, the information extracted 
from the two pillars is regularly presented to the public at the 
press conference that immediately follows the meeting in which 
the Governing Council takes its monetary policy decision for 
the euro area. It is also subsequently explained in the Monthly 
Bulletin of the ECB. Given the possibility of differing and even 
conﬂ  icting messages emerging from the analysis based on these 
pillars, a careful cross-checking of monetary and economic 
developments ensures the robustness of the analysis behind 
monetary policy decisions.
In a recent contribution, Papademos and Stark (2010) consider  2 
the possible enhancement of the monetary analysis while 
drawing on the lessons learnt from the ﬁ  nancial crisis of 2007-10. 
For the rapidly expanding ﬁ  eld of ﬁ  nancial stability analysis, 
Trichet (2011) discusses the intellectual challenges ahead.7
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1   INTRODUCTION
widely shared by institutional and private sector 
forecasters alike, including the ECB and the 
Eurosystem. One of the main conclusions to be 
drawn from the analysis here is that the errors 
made by forecasters largely relate to the large 
size of the shocks impacting the economy. 
Having said this, however, it would appear that 
the various tools used (including both reduced 
form and more structural macroeconometric 
models) failed to identify the importance and 
strength of key transmission and ampliﬁ  cation 
channels, especially those linked to ﬁ  nancial 
markets and uncertainty. Furthermore, such 
factors do not appear to have been adequately 
taken into account by experts when deciding 
upon the judgemental adjustments that are 
often made to reﬁ  ne the output of model-based 
forecasting exercises. 
The third section of the paper builds on the 
preceding discussion and attempts to identify 
a number of factors which, with the beneﬁ  t of 
hindsight, the economic analysis could – and 
in our view should – have paid more attention 
to during the crisis. These would include: i) the 
leading indicator properties of various ﬁ  nancial 
variables; ii) the prevalence of the non-linear 
dynamics that are intrinsically linked to a crisis 
environment and yet often neglected in our tools; 
and iii) the signalling aspect of conﬁ  dence and 
uncertainty indicators. In addition, it is argued 
that when the crisis intensiﬁ  ed,  particularly 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, the economic analysis might 
have relied more on judgement rather than on 
the results of mechanical tools. In extracting 
these lessons, we recognise the possibility of 
“hindsight bias” in such assessments, which 
would caution against our ability to exploit 
the insights gained in “real time” and in future 
crises.
Lastly, in the ﬁ   nal section of the paper, we 
identify some priorities for the way forward so 
that the economic analysis is developed further 
to take advantage of the lessons learnt and 
becomes more robust and adaptive to changing 
economic circumstances. The key priorities 
identiﬁ  ed include: i) the need to extend existing 
tools and also to develop new tools in order to 
account for important aspects, such as improved 
real-ﬁ  nancial linkages and non-linear dynamics; 
ii) to develop ways to handle the complexity 
arising from the presence of multiple models and 
alternative economic paradigms; and iii) given 
the limitations of point forecasts, for those 
conducting macroeconomic projections to 
consider further developing the characterisation 
of uncertainty surrounding the outlook as well 
as enriching the existing tools for identifying 
and quantifying the impact of important risks.8
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2  UNDERSTANDING THE KEY DRIVERS 
OF THE CRISIS 
While some parts of the global economy 
already showed signs of a slowdown in 
growth in late 2006 and early 2007, ﬁ  nancial 
factors undoubtedly played a strong role in 
triggering and subsequently amplifying the 
macroeconomic effects of the crisis. The ﬁ  rst 
such factor was the rise in overall ﬁ  nancing costs 
within the ﬁ  nancial sector and, by extension, for 
ﬁ  rms and households (see Chart 1). Following a 
signiﬁ  cant deterioration of conditions in the US 
housing market, a sharp increase in perceived 
default and liquidity risk precipitated a dramatic 
global re-pricing of risk. The result was an 
outbreak of turbulence in global money markets 
in August 2007; a development which signalled 
the onset of the ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
With regard to the euro area, the ﬁ  nancial nature 
of this global shock was reﬂ  ected most clearly in 
money market spreads and also in bank lending 
rate spreads for loans to households and non-
ﬁ   nancial corporations. The latter accentuated 
markedly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008; a period in which there 
was a further sharp rise in spreads and overall 
ﬁ  nancing costs that weighed heavily on euro area 
growth, most notably on investment spending.
A second ﬁ  nancial factor was the more general 
deterioration in asset markets beyond the US 
housing market. Sharp declines in stock prices 
(see Chart 2), and also in many countries in 
house prices, brought about a worsening in 
balance sheets for ﬁ  rms and households, thereby 
reinforcing the negative dynamics associated 
with increased perceptions of risk and higher   
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Note: An overnight indexed swap (OIS) is an interest rate swap 
where the periodic ﬂ  oating rate of the swap is exchanged for an 
overnight index. In this chart, the 3-month OIS rate, which is 
based on the 3-month euro overnight index average (EONIA), 
is used to calculate the spreads. “EURIBOR” refers to the 3-month 
euro interbank offered rate. “loans_large” refers to the interest 
rates applied by monetary ﬁ  nancial institutions (MFIs) to loans to 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations of over €1 million with a ﬂ  oating rate 
and an initial rate ﬁ  xation period of up to one year. “loans_small” 
refers to MFI interest rates on loans to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations 
of up to (and including) €1 million with a ﬂ  oating rate and an 
initial rate ﬁ  xation period of up to one year. Meanwhile, “BBB-
rated corporate bonds” refers to the euro-denominated non-
ﬁ  nancial corporate bond index calculated by Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch including maturities of over one year.
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2   UNDERSTANDING 
THE KEY DRIVERS 
OF THE CRISIS
ﬁ   nancing costs. Coupled with a decline in 
conﬁ  dence and real economic conditions, these 
developments were ultimately associated with 
a marked reduction in lending to ﬁ  rms  and 
households in the euro area. 
There was also evidence of an additional non-
price mechanism at play.3 For example, 
according to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) of 
the ECB, credit standards for loans to households 
and corporations tightened signiﬁ  cantly.  This 
survey ﬁ  rst started pointing to a tightening of 
credit standards (realised and expected) for 
private sector loans during the course of 2007 
and the situation worsened considerably in the 
second half of 2008. In the case of loans 
to households, bank credit tightening was 
particularly linked to declining prospects for the 
housing market and the general macroeconomic 
outlook. The latter was also a key factor behind 
the tighter funding conditions faced by ﬁ  rms, 
albeit being reinforced by industry and ﬁ  rm-
speciﬁ  c considerations as well as the high costs 
associated with the deterioration in the balance 
sheets and capital positions of banks. 4 
While  ﬁ   nancial factors were certainly central 
to triggering and subsequently amplifying the 
recessionary dynamics at play, it is important to 
highlight the signiﬁ  cant non-ﬁ  nancial elements 
involved. In particular, there was a generalised 
collapse in business and consumer conﬁ  dence 
that was highly synchronised across the main 
developed economies in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). With regard to euro area ﬁ  rms, the 
associated increase in uncertainty most likely 
contributed to a postponement of investment 
spending plans. Households also exhibited a 
sharp increase in precautionary behaviour, as 
reﬂ  ected in the dramatic rise in the household 
saving rate for the euro area.5
In addition, following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, global trade went into free fall 
(Chart 3), thereby amplifying the international 
transmission of the shock and the synchronicity 
of its effects. The contraction of trade ﬂ  ows had 
a big impact on economies such as those in the 
euro area. Ironically, the strong international 
linkages associated with the development 
of global supply chains, which had partially 
underpinned the robust growth in world trade in 
the period prior to the crisis, may actually have 
reinforced the downward spiral of the fourth 
quarter of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009.6 
Reﬂ   ecting these strong international linkages, 
the volume of euro area goods exports declined 
on average by over 16% in 2009, compared with 
2008. Indeed, the weakness of euro area exports 
largely explains why the collapse in euro area 
GDP was signiﬁ  cantly larger than the average 
decline in output experienced during previous 
systemic crises in the OECD countries.7 
See, for example, ECB (2009a) and Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and  3 
Peydro (2010). 
See, for example, Box 3 in the Monthly Bulletin of February 2009  4 
in which the results of the previous month’s Bank Lending 
Survey are reported and analysed. 
Box 6 in the Monthly Bulletin of August 2009 discusses the  5 
implications of this heightened uncertainty for economic 
prospects in the euro area.
This explanation for the severity of the crisis on global trade is  6 
discussed in Anderton and Kenny (2011).
See ECB (2009b).  7 
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Another important “real” factor behind the 
sharp adjustment in output and international 
trade during this period was a severe adjustment 
in inventories, reﬂ  ecting the heightened costs – 
both actual and perceived – of holding or 
accumulating inventories in an environment of 
uncertain future demand. Indeed, evidence 
from business surveys, such as the harmonised 
business surveys of the European Commission 
and the Eurozone Manufacturing Purchasing 
Managers’ Index (PMI), is consistent with the 
idea of some involuntary inventory 
accumulation during the crisis followed by a 
period in which excess inventory holdings 
were run down.8 For example, retailers may 
have reduced their stocks of ﬁ  nished goods by 
purchasing fewer goods from manufacturers, 
while manufacturers, in turn, were likely to 
have reduced their own stocks of materials and 
other inputs.9 Lastly, the volatility of inventory 
adjustment in 2008 and 2009 may also have 
reﬂ   ected less willingness on the part of 
suppliers to extend trade credit or trade ﬁ  nance 
in an environment of increased risk aversion 
and heightened sensitivity to credit risk. Trade 
credit may also have contributed to exacerbating 
the above-mentioned (dramatic) decline in 
international trade in some countries.10
To help conclude this review of the key 
economic drivers of the crisis, Chart 4 below 
attempts to provide a graphic summary – from 
the euro area perspective – of some of the main 
features that have been identiﬁ  ed to date. It is 
important to emphasise that this ﬁ  gure focuses 
on what were the key triggers, propagation 
and ampliﬁ   cation mechanisms rather than 
on providing any account of what ultimately 
“caused” the crisis. 
With the beneﬁ  t of hindsight, as Chart 4 would 
underline, the ﬁ  nancial sector was the trigger for 
economic developments during the crisis – a fact 
that contrasts with most of the standard business 
cycle analysis of the past 30 years, where the 
ﬁ  nancial sector is seen as being more passive and 
not always considered central to understanding 
cyclical dynamics. The developments that 
occurred were very much in line with the strand 
of research which emphasises the importance of 
ﬁ  nancial frictions and non-ﬁ  nancial factors, such 
as uncertainty shocks impacting households and 
ﬁ  rms. 
One key element highlighted in Chart 4 is 
the  feedback loops which may exist within 
the  ﬁ   nancial sector and also between the 
ﬁ   nancial and non-ﬁ   nancial sectors of the 
economy. Another key aspect underlined is 
the role of policy-makers and the impact of 
policy measures on private sector agents. 
A large number of crisis management policies 
were implemented in both the ﬁ  nancial  and 
non-ﬁ   nancial sectors, many of which can be 
assessed to have had benign effects in terms of 
stabilising the economic situation. Also notable, 
however, was the contribution of the government 
sector to raising uncertainty, especially regarding 
the build-up of ﬁ  scal imbalances and sovereign 
risk in some countries. This was particularly 
evidenced by the 2010 increase in the long-term 
government bond yields of a number of euro 
area countries, following a rapid deterioration in 
their ﬁ  scal position. 
Furthermore, Chart 4 very clearly shows 
the complexity of the interactions across 
sectors and policy agents. Such complexity 
poses many challenges for the economic 
analysis, particularly in relation to the use of 
models. These often make use of simplifying 
assumptions regarding the exogeneity of certain 
variables and thus effectively exclude particular 
feedback channels. 
De Rougement (2011) also discusses the role of inventories  8 
during the global recession precipitated by the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
The evidence on inventory adjustment during the crisis is  9 
discussed in more detail in Box 5 of the Monthly Bulletin of 
May 2009.
Considerable challenges arise in attempting to identify particular  10 
channels, mechanisms or frictions behind the collapse in global 
trade. For example, Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2011) 
question whether this collapse resulted from factors impeding 
international transactions or, more simply, whether it was due 
to goods being heavily traded in international markets. Their 
ﬁ  ndings suggest that the collapse in global trade was largely 
related to the latter rather than speciﬁ  c factors impeding trade per 
se (although for a small number of countries such factors were in 
fact more relevant). 11
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2   UNDERSTANDING 
THE KEY DRIVERS 
OF THE CRISIS
In conclusion, the macroeconomic developments 
that occurred during the ﬁ   nancial crisis of 
2007-10 have been so dramatic and extreme that 
they could be seen as a “once-in-a-century” 
event – a perspective which, arguably, may 
imply some limitation on what can be learnt for 
economic analysis during more normal times. 
Such extreme ﬂ  uctuations are also characteristic 
of an environment of panic, reﬂ  ecting human 
responses to the absence of trust and the 
materialisation of fear and contagion or what 
economists tend to call “Knightian” uncertainty. 
At the same time, the ﬁ  nancial crisis has clearly 
cast considerable doubt on the so-called “Great 
Moderation”  11, thereby suggesting that the level 
of macroeconomic instability and volatility 
recently observed may possibly be more 
prevalent or more frequently occurring when 
viewed from a forward-looking perspective. 
In this respect, our future work may have much 
to learn from our understanding of these recent 
developments.
The “Great Moderation”, a term coined by Stock and Watson  11 
(2002), refers to the reduction in the volatility of the business 
cycles of many advanced economies that started in the mid-
1980s. 
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3  HOW DID THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FARE 
DURING THE CRISIS? 
3.1  THE NEAR-TERM OUTLOOK
As discussed in the introduction, the economic 
analysis provides an important analytical input 
into monetary policy deliberations, generating 
timely and, ideally, accurate information on the 
economic situation and outlook. One key 
element in the preparation of such projections is 
our assessment of the current state of the 
economy in real time or what are sometimes 
referred to as “early estimates” of GDP.12 These 
include a “backcast” of output developments in 
the previous quarter (required, given the 
substantial lags in the publication of national 
accounts), a “nowcast” for the current quarter 
and a near-term “forecast” for the quarter to 
follow. A large array of tools is commonly used 
to make an assessment of the current economic 
situation and its likely evolution over the short 
term. These feature tools attempting to 
synthesise the information available for a large 
cross section of high frequency indicators 
(e.g. from surveys and ﬁ  nancial markets) and to 
extrapolate their short-term trends. The latter 
tools include dynamic factor models which 
attempt to average over a large number of data 
series as well as simpler “bridge” equations 
linking key indicators to the components of euro 
area demand.13
Chart 5 displays some early estimates of euro 
area GDP obtained from a range of differing 
speciﬁ   cations for bridge and factor models. 
These have been constructed using the vintages 
of data that were available at the time in order 
to illustrate the difﬁ  culties of such mechanical 
estimates over the period concerned. For each 
quarterly GDP outcome, there are six early 
estimates based on data at intervals of roughly 
two weeks (ranging from forecasts to backcasts, 
as described above). The dynamic factor models 
and bridge equations estimated use aggregate 
euro area data as well as data at the sectoral, 
expenditure component and country level. 
For simplicity, we report the range of outcomes for 
quarterly euro area GDP as a vertical line, while 
the mean is shown in the horizontal reddish 
brown line. What is striking is the clear failure 
of all models to capture the period of exceptional 
macroeconomic weakness in the fourth quarter 
of 2008 and the ﬁ   rst quarter of 2009. It is 
also noteworthy that broadly similar forecast 
errors were also made by private forecasters 
(as reported in the Euro Zone Barometer).
Although, most estimates demonstrate some 
convergence towards the outcome as more 
short-term economic information becomes 
available, even the ﬁ  nal estimates for 2008Q4 
and 2009Q1 (made available just prior to 
the ofﬁ   cial release of GDP data) point to a 
signiﬁ   cantly higher, albeit negative, GDP 
growth rate than the rate of between -2.0% 
and -2.5% actually registered. A key failure 
See, for instance, ECB (2008a). 12 
Such tools and their application are described in some detail in  13 
Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2010).
Chart 5 Early estimates of euro area GDP 
from a range of factor models and bridge 
equations plus the Euro Zone Barometer
(quarterly percentage change)
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2008 2009 2010
outcome
























Sources: Calculations using factor models/bridge equations and 
the Euro Zone Barometer of MJEconomics.13 13
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of the economic analysis during the crisis 
was therefore its inability to deliver reliable 
information on the current state of the economy; 
information which could have been used to help 
shape the more medium-term outlook. There 
are a number of reasons for this poor predictive 
performance. For example, there is the fact that 
tools are estimated over sample periods where 
such sharp volatility in growth dynamics has 
not previously been observed. Also, most, 
if not all, of the models used are essentially 
designed with the assumption of a stationary 
environment with mean reversion in growth 
dynamics, while the crisis developments were 
undoubtedly non-stationary in nature. 
Complications in the identiﬁ  cation of seasonal 
factors (given the large ﬂ  uctuation in GDP and 
other macroeconomic time series around the 
turn-of-the-year 2008-09) as well as possible 
changes in the signalling power of survey data 
(due to an exceptionally strong adjustment in 
consumer and corporate sentiment) may have 
played a further role.14 More speciﬁ  cally, most 
survey data are reported as balance statistics 
summarising the qualitative and subjective 
assessments of survey respondents. As such, 
they may not always have a direct, stable or 
linear relationship with actual developments in 
related economic series (e.g. as regards output, 
consumption, employment and prices). Lastly, 
as the recovery started to take hold, growth 
dynamics may have been driven by factors that 
are not easily incorporated into our short-term 
tools. For example, a number of government 
policies were introduced (such as the car 
scrapping premium) which positively impacted 
growth dynamics in the second half of 2009.15
3.2 MEDIUM-TERM  PROJECTIONS
In the midst of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the imprecise 
nature of the information on the current and 
near-term state of the euro area economy was 
also accompanied by substantially higher 
medium-term projection errors for euro area 
GDP and, to a lesser extent, consumer price 
inﬂ  ation, as measured by the Harmonised Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP). 
Chart 6 plots the evolution of ECB and 
Eurosystem projections for euro area GDP in 
2008 and 2009, together with the corresponding 
projections from a range of private sector 
entities (MJEconomics (Euro Zone Barometer), 
Consensus Economics and ECB Survey of 
Professional Forecasters) and international 
organisations (the IMF, the OECD and the 
European Commission). In contrast to the 
projections from other institutions, those of 
staff within the ECB and the Eurosystem are 
presented in the form of ranges rather than as 
point estimates. The use of ranges acknowledges 
the inevitable uncertainty surrounding 
macroeconomic projections and, based on 
the current method, the width of the ranges is 
For a discussion of the challenges posed by the crisis linked to  14 
the interpretation of seasonally adjusted data, see Box 7 in the 
Monthly Bulletin of August 2009.
Box 5 in the Monthly Bulletin of December 2010 reviews  15 
developments in the euro area and the global car industry, 
and highlights the role of vehicle scrapping schemes and massive 
government bailouts in some countries.
Chart 6 Evolution of euro area GDP 
forecasts for 2009
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outcome
Consensus Economics
Sources: ECB, European Commission, IMF, OECD, 
MJEconomics and Consensus Economics.
Note: The x-axis shows the release dates of various estimates.14
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calibrated such that it is consistent with a 57.5% 
conﬁ  dence interval.16
It is clear that all of the projections in this chart 
were strongly lagging actual developments; 
only in late 2008 did public and private 
sector institutions begin to make downward 
adjustments to their growth forecasts for 2009, 
albeit while clearly underestimating the severity 
of the downward spiral that was taking place at 
that time. As regards the projections of the ECB 
and the Eurosystem staff, despite the attempt 
to capture the role of forecast uncertainty via 
the publication of projection ranges, the scale 
of subsequent forecast errors is suggestive of 
the wider uncertainty prevailing in this period. 
Indeed, only by mid-2009 were the available 
forecasts coming close to the eventual outturn 
of a decline in average annual euro area GDP of 
just over 4%. 
A similar, though less dramatic, pattern 
can be seen when looking at forecasts for 
2010 (see Chart 7). In this case, forecasters 
systematically underestimated the strength 
of the recovery. In the ﬁ  rst half of 2009, most 
forecasters expected very slow growth in 2010, 
with a fair proportion of them even anticipating 
a fall in output. As more positive news emerged 
in the second half of 2009, the forecasts were 
steadily revised upwards but still remained well 
short of the ﬁ  nal outcome until the last quarter 
of the year.  
The evidently lagging nature of the information 
contained in most projections, together with 
the large projection errors made, highlights the 
inability of standard macroeconomic tools to 
deliver accurate point forecasts during times of 
heightened economic stress. Indeed, economic 
developments during periods of crisis and 
instability are, by their very nature, exceedingly 
unpredictable. 
A relevant question with regard to the 
performance of forecasters is whether it is 
realistic to expect them to predict the timing of 
crises. Ex ante it may be impossible to identify 
the particular source, trigger mechanism and 
timing of a crisis event.17 To the extent that such 
factors could have been identiﬁ  ed, they might 
merely have just brought forward the 
materialisation of the crisis itself. In this respect, 
there may be some hindsight bias in an ex post 
analysis of forecast errors, reﬂ  ecting a tendency 
to believe – having knowledge of the key factors 
at the centre of the crisis – that we should have 
identiﬁ   ed in a more timely manner its onset. 
Arguably, it is in the period after the onset 
See ECB (2009c). Various methods have been employed by staff  16 
at the ECB to compute these ranges. From the ﬁ  rst publication 
of the staff projections of the ECB and the Eurosystem 
(December 2000) until June 2008, the published projection 
ranges for each variable and horizon represented twice the 
mean absolute projection error constructed on the basis of an 
analysis of historical projection errors. These published ranges 
were derived using a short sample of projection errors which 
was not updated over time. Another, model-based method was 
used for the staff projections published from September 2008 
to September 2009, while in December 2009 the method for 
calculating the ranges was further updated to take account of the 
most recent projection errors and to allow for some correction 
for very extreme observations or outliers.
This has been likened to seismologists anticipating the timing  17 
of an earthquake (Spaventa, 2009).
Chart 7 Evolution of euro area GDP 
forecasts for 2010
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Sources: ECB, European Commission, IMF, OECD, 
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of the crisis, and not before it, that the scope 
for improvements in predictability may lie. 
For example, prior to the dramatic events of 
September and October 2008, the possibility for 
enhancing our projections was probably very 
low. However, in the light of the key events that 
took place (such as the outbreak of contagion in 
the  ﬁ   nancial sector), forecasters might have 
identiﬁ  ed better the severity and likely evolution 
of the macroeconomic events that were to 
unfold.18
The above poor performance is partially related 
to inaccuracies in terms of the technical 
(e.g. interest rates, stock prices, exchange rates, 
commodity prices) or other relevant underlying 
assumptions or forecasts (e.g. for external 
demand) that are used to underpin the euro area 
macroeconomic projections.19 For example, 
the over-prediction of euro area inﬂ  ation in the 
wake of the ﬁ  nancial crisis is inevitably linked 
to errors in fundamental assumptions about oil 
and other commodity prices, namely that they 
would evolve in line with the expectations 
embedded in commodity futures contracts. 
However, as regards GDP growth, it is unlikely 
that the scale of the observed projection 
errors can be explained by errors in technical 
assumptions alone. Rather, given the scale 
of the deterioration in forecast performance 
highlighted by Charts 6 and 7, these errors were 
most likely also a reﬂ  ection of inadequacies in 
both our forecasting tools and expert judgements 
(as projections include judgemental adjustments). 
Such shortcomings may have resulted in an 
inability to identify the degree of persistence in 
the shocks impacting the euro area and/or an 
underestimation of their associated transmission 
and propagation mechanisms (e.g. the likely 
feedback loops between the real economy and 
the ﬁ  nancial sector highlighted in Chart 4). 
The preceding analysis clearly demonstrates 
that forecast errors were remarkably high during 
the crisis period, perhaps reﬂ  ecting  both the 
unpredictability of events and shortcomings in 
our models or expert judgement. Nevertheless, 
and in line with the evidence in Charts 6 and 7, 
it is important to note that the projections of the 
ECB and the Eurosystem were not systematically 
worse than those of other institutions over this 
period. In other words, the failure to predict 
the depth of the crisis was widespread among 
professional economists and not just speciﬁ  c to 
forecasters at these institutions. 
It should also be acknowledged that, given the 
truly exceptional nature of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
it is not surprising that forecast errors were 
exacerbated during this period. Moreover, even 
if forecasters were consistently underestimating 
the severity of the economic contraction, 
they did at least offer some reliable qualitative 
signals for policy-makers. For example, the staff 
projections of the ECB for March 2009 predicted 
that euro area GDP growth would be negative in 
2009, ranged between -3.2% and -2.2%. What 
this implied was the worst recession since the 
end of World War II – an assessment which 
was undoubtedly borne out by subsequent 
developments. 
3.3  ANALYSIS OF UNCERTAINTY AND RISKS
One feature evident in Charts 6 and 7 is the 
relative proximity of the macroeconomic 
projections from the different institutions and 
the analysts in the private sector. Given the 
nature and magnitude of the shock hitting 
the global economy and the considerable 
uncertainty that existed at the time, it is perhaps 
surprising that there was not greater divergence 
between private and institutional forecasters. 
In particular, to the extent that agents have 
different models or adapt their forecasts at 
different speeds in response to economic news, 
one would expect large shocks to be associated 
with higher levels of forecaster disagreement. 
Caballero (2010) emphasises the clear limits to improvements  18 
in prediction during periods of crises: “Modern Cassandras will 
always claim to have seen the crisis coming. What they will not 
tell you is how many times they saw things coming that never 
materialized or how the speciﬁ  c mechanisms behind the crisis 
are different from those on which their predictions were based”.
The technical assumptions underpinning the macroeconomic  19 
projections of staff in the ECB and the Eurosystem are regularly 
described in a box in the Monthly Bulletin. See, for example, 
Box 8 in the December 2010 issue of the ECB Monthly Bulletin. 16
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However, the similarity of projections on the 
part of professional forecasters and institutions 
publishing projections might be seen as 
symptomatic of some “herding” behaviour.
More detailed sources of information on 
individual forecasters do, however, suggest 
heightened disagreement. According to the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) of the 
ECB, which is based on a panel of approximately 
90 separate forecasters, the standard deviation 
of the individual one-year ahead forecasts for 
euro area GDP – a measure of forecaster 
disagreement – increased from below 
0.2 percentage point in late 2007 to above 
0.6 percentage point in the second quarter of 
2009.20
Notwithstanding the above evidence on 
disagreement about point forecasts, there 
may also have been a tendency to reﬂ  ect the 
deterioration in the outlook during the crisis 
more in the analysis and the communication 
of risks surrounding projections, rather than 
in revisions to the baseline or central scenario. 
For example, in summarising the view of 
the Governing Council in December 2008, 
the Monthly Bulletin of the ECB states that 
“…the economic outlook remains surrounded 
by an exceptionally high degree of uncertainty. 
Risks to economic growth lie on the downside”. 
One distinct message emerging from recent 
experience may thus be that point forecasts 
have limitations, especially during periods of 
macroeconomic instability. During such times, 
the analysis of the risks accompanying our 
outlook may prove to be a more informative 
source of input into monetary policy discussions. 
Chart 8 below provides some further evidence 
on the real time role of expert risk assessments 
during the crisis, drawing on information from 
the SPF conducted by the ECB. 
The chart shows the baseline projection from 
various vintages of the SPF, together with the 
corresponding risk balance indicator extracted 
from the probability forecasts also collected 
under the survey. The risk balance indicates 
the probability of observing growth lower than 
the point forecast as indicated in each survey 
over the period. It is noteworthy that the risk 
analysis seems to point to a sharp increase in 
downside risks in late 2007 and that the SPF 
correctly identiﬁ  ed more signiﬁ  cant downside 
risks over the course of 2008 (with the 
survey round of August 2008 being a notable 
exception). Also, the risk analysis highlighted an 
intensiﬁ  cation of those risks in November 2008. 
On the other hand, given that the survey 
continued to predict positive growth rates for 
2009 in the November 2008 round, there is clear 
evidence that the severity of the downside risks 
was underestimated during the period when the 
actual free fall in activity (described in Section 1) 
Chart 11 in Section 3 of this paper highlights the upward  20 
impact of increased forecaster disagreement on overall forecast 
uncertainty. The increase in forecaster disagreement is very much 
in line with other stylised facts on the behaviour of forecaster 
disagreement over the business cycle. For example, Dovern et al. 
(2009) demonstrate that disagreement about real variables has a 
strong tendency to intensify during periods of recession.
Chart 8 Risk analysis for 2009 GDP growth 
forecasts from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters of the ECB
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was already taking place. Furthermore, in the 
February 2009 survey, when the point forecast 
for 2009 had been revised downwards to signal 
decidedly negative growth, the upside skew in 
the SPF risk assessment was providing a clearly 
erroneous signal concerning the state of the 
economy. Overall, the experience with the SPF 
probability forecasts during the crisis period is 
somewhat mixed and thus suggests the necessity 
of exploring new ways to improve the usefulness 
of such indicators in the future. 
3.4 MACROECONOMIC  MODELS
The large projection errors recently experienced 
would imply that there is still signiﬁ  cant 
room for improvement among professional 
and institutional forecasters; a theme that 
we shall return to in the remainder of this 
paper. As indicated previously, the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis has also pointed to weaknesses in the 
macroeconomic models which support our 
projections. In particular, criticism has been 
directed at state-of-the-art dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models, although 
much of this is actually just as relevant to the 
other, more traditional, “workhorse” models 
used for forecasting in central banks, including 
those implemented within the Eurosystem.21
Mainstream macro models have been criticised 
for having unrealistic assumptions (e.g. perfect 
information and rational expectations) and for 
paying little or no attention to ﬁ  nancial frictions, 
the role of the banking sector and to non-linear 
dynamics or interrelationships. The crisis has 
therefore provided a strong impetus to modelling 
research, particularly in terms of enriching the 
role of the ﬁ  nancial sector and in attempting 
to relax other important assumptions, such as 
rationality and linearity. 
Despite these criticisms, DSGE and other 
traditional macroeconomic models remain very 
useful tools. For example, they can be used to 
help test the internal consistency of a particular 
economic theory with the data and may, thus, 
provide clues about the essential facts that need 
to be considered when interpreting business 
cycle dynamics. In this regard, the structural 
interpretation of the shocks in DSGE models 
means that they may have an important value 
in helping to interpret economic developments 
as they unfold. This real time “interpretative 
function” of models also applies to some of 
the short-term forecasting tools. For example, 
a signiﬁ   cant recent advance in the use of 
factor models has been the ability to trace 
how economic news shapes revisions to early 
estimates of GDP. 22
To give an idea of the interpretative value 
of models, Chart 9 presents the historical 
decomposition of euro area GDP developments 
using the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) 
of the ECB for the period from early 2007 to 
mid-2010. Although the ﬁ  nancial sector plays 
only a passive role in the NAWM23, the model 
provides nonetheless an insightful interpretation 
of the crisis events as they unfolded at the time. 
In particular, the NAWM emphasises the 
strong role of international factors – linked to 
external demand and the importance of 
international linkages noted earlier in Section 1 – 
in contributing negatively to euro area GDP 
growth, especially during the initial phase of 
the downturn and when the free fall in activity 
occurred around the turn-of-the-year 2008-09. 
Considering the downturn from this perspective, 
it is clear from the NAWM interpretation that 
several important domestic factors also 
contributed negatively to the evolution of euro 
area GDP. For instance, the strong role played 
by risk premia in depressing domestic demand, 
resulting in relatively weak investment and 
heightened precautionary behaviour among 
euro area households. In addition, nominal 
adjustment – especially downward wage 
Economists such as Buiter (2009), Akerlof and Shiller (2009)  21 
and Krugman (2010) have argued that the current generation 
of micro-founded theory-based models represent a wrong turn 
for the economics profession. On the other hand, Lucas (2009) 
provides a more positive assessment of these models.
See Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2010). 22 
See Christoffel, Coenen and Warne (2008). Ongoing research  23 
is aimed at extending the NAWM to include ﬁ  nancial frictions. 
Meanwhile other models in use at the ECB, such as that of 
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003), already incorporate 
important ﬁ  nancial frictions.18
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adjustment – was relatively limited in the period 
immediately following the large negative 
shocks to output and demand. This contributed 
further to the prolongation of the downturn, 
as reﬂ  ected in the visibly negative impact of the 
mark-up shocks to GDP growth. The NAWM 
interpretation also helps to identify the function 
of negative supply side factors (technology 
shocks) that may have been linked to dampened 
prospects for euro area potential growth around 
the turn-of-the-year 2008-09. Lastly, the model 
determines the role of monetary policy measures 
in helping to stimulate the economy from 
mid-2009 onwards.24
This section has highlighted the widespread 
failure to predict the macroeconomic 
developments that occurred during the crisis as 
well as their severity. Although such a failure 
may not be all that surprising, given that existing 
tools were largely developed with “normal” 
business cycle ﬂ   uctuations in mind, it still 
raises questions about the appropriateness of 
using such tools during periods of exceptional 
macroeconomic volatility. This calls for further 
work to assess the appropriate economic tools 
for periods of macroeconomic stress and the 
extent to which the output of these tools should 
also reﬂ  ect off-model information (e.g. expert 
judgement) in order to help reduce forecast 
errors in times of extreme macroeconomic 
turbulence.  
The fact that the contribution of monetary policy is not positive  24 
before mid-2009 (and is even negative) may reﬂ  ect that in the 
NAWM the policy contribution captures only the interest rate 
effect which is restricted by the zero lower bound. Moreover, 
non-standard monetary policy measures are not included in 
the model. 
Chart 9 NAWM decomposition of GDP growth from 
the vantage point of the September 2010 staff 
macroeconomic projection exercise (MPE) of the ECB





























Source: Calculations based on Christoffel, Coenen and Warne 
(2008).
Note: The chart shows the contribution of various groups of 
structural shocks to the deviation of output growth from its 
steady state rate of growth (0.5% quarter-on-quarter).19
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The experience with macroeconomic tools and 
projections during the period of ﬁ  nancial crisis 
offers an important opportunity – with the 
beneﬁ  t of hindsight – to identify the factors and 
developments to which the economic analysis 
could have paid more attention. This insight 
may also help establish where improvements 
are required and the priority areas for future 
tool development. Four particular areas are 
highlighted below. 
4.1 FINANCIAL  FACTORS
Given the role of the ﬁ  nancial sector during the 
crisis, it would appear that economic forecasts 
could have been improved if more weight had 
been given to ﬁ  nancial variables. A number of 
studies have found, for instance, that stock prices 
can be informative for GDP developments.25 
Indeed, the importance of ﬁ  nancial factors was 
appreciated in real-time by ECB/Eurosystem 
staff forecasters who took account of tighter 
ﬁ   nancing conditions emanating from wider 
ﬁ  nancial market spreads as well as tighter credit 
standards in their projections.26
A new monthly Area-wide Leading Indicator 
(ALI) for the euro area business cycle has 
recently been developed which seeks to exploit 
the possible leading indicator properties of 
particular ﬁ  nancial series.27 The ALI is derived 
by choosing nine leading series, including a 
number of ﬁ   nancial variables and survey-
based conﬁ  dence measures. As demonstrated 
in Chart 10, it can help to predict – in real 
time – the euro area business cycle during the 
recession of 2008-09 and the following upturn. 
As can be seen from the chart, on the eve of 
the crisis (May 2007), the ALI was already 
indicating that the cyclical peak had passed. 
Prior to the intensiﬁ  cation of the crisis in the 
autumn of 2008, the ALI was signalling a 
move into a below trend phase of the cycle 
and by mid-summer 2009 there were the 
ﬁ   rst tentative signs that the cyclical trough 
had passed.
Aside from the clear need to develop reduced 
form indicators and short-term forecasting tools 
See, for instance, De Bondt (2009) and Anderson and D’Agostino  25 
(2008).
As indicated, for instance, in the text accompanying the ECB/ 26 
Eurosystem staff projections disclosed at the time (e.g. the 
December 2007 and June 2008 issues of the Monthly Bulletin).
Such an approach is proposed in De Bondt and Hahn (2010). 27 
Chart 10 Turning point predictions – 
Area-wide Leading Indicator (ALI)
(standardised deviation from trend)
Area-wide Leading Indicator (ALI)
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Sources: De Bondt and Hahn (2010).
Note: The BCI refers to the deviation of economic activity 
(measured by monthly industrial production excluding 
construction) from its trend level using a one-sided band pass 
ﬁ  lter. The ALI is shifted by the ﬁ  ve months it leads the BCI.20
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adequately reﬂ  ecting the information content of 
ﬁ  nancial variables, an additional challenge will 
be the incorporation of ﬁ   nancial frictions and 
ﬁ  nancial intermediation into forecasting models. 
It has long been known that ﬁ  nancial markets 
are imperfect due to, inter alia, information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders 
as well as the costly enforcement of ﬁ  nancial 
contracts. In this regard, research which predates 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis has highlighted the importance 
of such frictions in the propagation of crises and 
as a key ampliﬁ  er and source of business cycle 
ﬂ  uctuations.28 For the euro area, in particular, 
the role of ﬁ   nancial frictions in driving the 
cyclical dynamics has been underlined by the 
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (CMR) model.29 
Despite these examples, it seems fair to say that 
ﬁ  nancial frictions have not played a major role 
in large-scale macroeconomic models.30 Much 
work remains to be done in this ﬁ  eld in terms 
of assessing which frictions are most important 
and whether models with ﬁ  nancial frictions can 
meaningfully characterise the nature of ﬁ  nancial 
crises. It is also unclear whether such models can 
be useful in real time for analysing economic 
developments and informing policy-makers 
about the possible impact of differing policy 
responses. 
4.2 NON-LINEARITIES 
Standard tools based on a stationary and linear 
environment can serve us well in providing 
point estimates for GDP growth and inﬂ  ation 
during “normal times”. However, they are 
far less reliable during periods of extreme 
economic and ﬁ  nancial turbulence where non-
linearities and non-stationarities are likely to be 
prevalent. This suggests that non-linear models 
are worth investigating, although there is very 
mixed evidence as to whether they can reliably 
improve forecasting performance in real time.31
The possible relevance of non-linear effects can 
be investigated with regime-switching models, 
distinguishing between periods of low and high 
growth. Such methods attempt to incorporate 
the uncertainty associated with our knowledge 
of the state of the economy and allow, to some 
extent, for divergent economic dynamics, 
depending on the particular economic conditions 
prevailing at a given point in time. Such tools 
can also utilise the information contained in 
ﬁ  nancial variables to help identify the timing of 
regime changes. This type of model, when 
applied to the period of ﬁ  nancial crisis, shows a 
clear increase in the probability of the euro area 
entering a recession around six months in 
advance of the start of the 2008-09 recession.32 
While such tools thus appear to hold some 
potential – particularly in terms of interpreting 
or understanding developments – it is important 
to bear in mind the limitations that may apply to 
them in practice. With the beneﬁ  t of hindsight, 
it is often possible to ﬁ  nd a “good” non-linear 
model that “ﬁ  ts” the data for a crisis period. 
However, in real time, such methods may pose 
substantial challenges that could limit their actual 
usefulness for out-of-sample prediction. In other 
words, such models may explain features in data 
that do not occur very frequently, but if these 
features are not present in the forecast period or 
the crisis in question, then they are unlikely to 
be of beneﬁ  t at that time. 
4.3 CONFIDENCE,  EXPECTATIONS 
AND UNCERTAINTY 
In line with the analysis presented in Sections 1 
and 2, a generalised collapse in business and 
See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke,  28 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
See Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003). De Fiore and  29 
Tristani (2009) propose a calibrated model with asymmetric 
information under which shocks have a strong impact on spreads 
and on economic growth. In particular, the decline in investment 
is of the same magnitude as that observed during the recent 
crisis.
See Fagan and Morgan (2005) for a comprehensive, albeit  30 
somewhat dated, description of the main macroeconomic models 
used by euro area central banks.
Harding and Pagan (2002) ﬁ   nd little evidence that certain  31 
non-linearities are important to the nature of business cycles. 
See Teräsvirta (2006) for a review of the experience with 
non-linear models in economic forecasting. Similarly, in an 
earlier review article, Clements, Franses and Swanson (2004) 
conclude that simple, reliable and easy to use non-linear model 
speciﬁ  cation, estimation and forecasting procedures will only be 
readily available in the distant future.
See Bellégo and Ferrara (2009) for the euro area.For the US, Hubrich  32 
and Tetlow (2010) use a Markov-Switching VAR model to examine 
economic dynamics under regimes of ﬁ  nancial stress and non-stress.21
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consumer conﬁ  dence (both in the euro area and 
globally) was a central feature of the recent 
recession. There are mixed views among 
macroeconomists about the value added of 
survey-based measures of conﬁ   dence and how 
they should be used in practice, together with 
hard data and macro models and other economic 
tools. Traditionally, conﬁ   dence indicators have 
been treated by macroeconomists as providing 
some information for the short-term assessment, 
especially in situations where other “hard” 
indicators are lagging. But many are sceptical 
about whether such indicators provide more 
information than that contained in other variables. 
There have also been some examples (around 
the time of noteworthy events) where conﬁ  dence 
measures have reacted much more strongly than 
the subsequent hard data that they might have 
been expected to track.33 Furthermore, given 
the extremely low values realised by some 
conﬁ  dence measures at certain points in time, 
there is the possibility of non-linear response 
patterns from the balance statistics reported in 
some surveys. Nevertheless, in the recent crisis, 
there was clearly a strong “crisis of conﬁ  dence” 
and such measures generally did not provide 
misleading signals and could have been relied 
upon more as the crisis intensiﬁ  ed in the latter 
part of 2008.34
Even among those macroeconomists who regard 
conﬁ   dence measures as helpful in the near-
term, conﬁ   dence has often been disregarded 
as a major driver of medium-term economic 
developments for which more fundamental 
factors (such as income, real wages and 
employment) play the dominant role. However, 
the recent crisis has certainly highlighted that 
conﬁ   dence indicators may provide important 
information about the development of private 
sector perceptions regarding uncertainty and 
that this is a factor that may have substantial 
implications for the real economy. 
For example, given the irreversibility of 
investment decisions, heightened uncertainty 
may be associated with a sudden sharp stop in 
investment expenditures related to a connected 
increase in the “option value” of waiting. 
Similarly, heightened uncertainty about future 
income prospects may cause households 
to delay consumption and to increase their 
savings. Recent work shows that conﬁ  dence 
indicators can have some predictive power 
to explain euro area private consumption 
expenditure, even when controlling for more 
usual explanatory factors (such as income, 
wealth and employment). In particular, these 
indicators appear to matter especially in periods 
of heightened uncertainty (featuring ﬁ  nancial 
crises or geopolitical tensions) where they may 
play a signiﬁ  cant  role.35 There may also be 
substantial non-linear effects on real activity 
associated with shocks to uncertainty.36
A related aspect concerns the formation of 
private sector expectations; something which 
may also be partially captured by new 
approaches to analysing how agents “learn” 
about economic developments. A good example 
of this is to be found within the learning 
mechanisms of the New Multi-Country Model 
(NMCM) of the ECB which allow the forward-
looking components driving investment and 
consumption decisions to adjust downwards in 
response to negative economic news. This 
analysis has also pointed to some clear 
divergences across the euro area regarding the 
impact of the crisis on households’ and ﬁ  rms’ 
expectations about economic prospects.37
Overall, there would seem to be a need to 
further develop indicators of uncertainty and 
to possibly incorporate such indicators into 
macroeconomic models. One potentially rich 
source of information on uncertainty is the 
SPF of the ECB which can combine the signals 
from measures of forecaster disagreement with 
These would include consumer conﬁ  dence around the time of the  33 
Long-Term Capital Management crisis and industrial conﬁ  dence 
following the attacks of “September 11”.
See ECB (2008). 34 
See Dees and Soares Brinca (2011). 35 
See Bloom (2009). 36 
See Dieppe, González Pandiella, Hall and Willman (2011)  37 
and Dieppe, González Pandiella, and Willman (2011).22
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information from the density forecasts of survey 
participants (see Chart 11 which also shows 
some data on implied volatility in ﬁ  nancial 
markets). The latter may also signal the extent 
to which changes in uncertainty are seen as 
only affecting the short to medium term, or 
are expected to be more persistent, given that 
the SPF provides information on perceived 
uncertainty over different time horizons, i.e. for 
one, two and up to ﬁ   ve years ahead. In this 
respect, a notable feature during the crisis was 
the widespread upward shift of uncertainty 
indicators relating to GDP, as observed in 
Chart 11. The concurrent upward shift in both 
short and long-term uncertainty indicators may 
help explain the strength of the precautionary 
behaviour of ﬁ  rms and households during the 
most intensive phases of the crisis.
4.4 JUDGEMENT 
In its narrowest sense, judgement can be deﬁ  ned 
as what one adds to the mechanical results of 
a model or tool in order to produce a given 
projection (although it can also encompass the 
choice of which models or tools to use). Judgement 
has always played a role in projections and can 
take the form of “add-factors” in traditional 
macroeconomic models or “structural shocks” in 
DSGE models. Expert judgement is included into 
models to take account of elements not present 
in these models and it may be calibrated using 
another tool thought to be more reliable or to 
contain additional relevant information in a given 
set of circumstances. A key challenge in improving 
the nature of the judgement used in the economic 
analysis and in projections is to ensure that there 
are some rigorous foundations underpinning its 
formation and that expert judgement should not 
simply involve “best guesses” or unsubstantiated 
opinions.
In large-scale models, judgement allows 
for many additional factors to be taken into 
account. These would include inﬂ  uences such 
as conﬁ   dence, adjustments for possible non-
linear impacts and ﬁ  nancial factors, all of which 
could stem from other tools. In calibrating 
their judgement, experts should place a strong 
emphasis on understanding the sources and 
determinants of forecast errors in real time 
as well as their economic interpretation 
(e.g. whether they reﬂ  ect structural change or 
demand shocks) and thereby help to form an 
understanding of the likely persistence of recent 
shocks. In this respect, judgement can also be of 
help in the assessment of which tools are likely 
to prove most reliable at any particular point 
in time.
The use of judgement also provides an 
opportunity to depart from the standard 
economic paradigms that are embedded in our 
macroeconomic models. For instance, such tools 
typically do not take account of departures from 
rational behaviour (e.g. “fairness” considerations 
in labour economics, the role of simple rules of 
thumb when forming expectations, information 
cascades, herding and panic behaviour in 
ﬁ   nancial markets and modelling of excessive 
risk-taking behaviour) plus the existence of 
highly persistent disequilibria and imbalances. 
Considerations of this nature can be exceedingly 
complex to model and it is not realistic (or even 
desirable) to expect them to be incorporated into 
Chart 11 Confidence channels and output 
uncertainty
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4   THE BENEFIT 
OF HINDSIGHT: 
WHAT SHOULD WE 
HAVE PAID MORE 
ATTENTION TO?
our workhorse models to a signiﬁ  cant extent, 
so it is necessary to develop auxiliary models 
or tools. Of course, allowing such factors to 
inﬂ  uence our thinking and hence the judgement 
we put into a projection, requires an openness to 
depart from the standard paradigms. 
4.5 INTERNATIONAL  LINKAGES 
The crisis has highlighted the need to pay 
greater attention to the international dimension 
of economic analysis, especially in the context 
of highly integrated international ﬁ  nancial 
systems and more closely integrated production 
processes (e.g. via global supply chains).38 Whilst 
many of the shortcomings in the international 
projections  are simply reﬂ  ections of the same 
failings which can be seen in projections for 
the euro area, the crisis has shown that there is 
a particular need to pay more attention to the 
international transmission of both ﬁ  nancial and 
conﬁ  dence factors. 
There is also evidence of a link between US and 
euro area conﬁ  dence, as US conﬁ  dence shocks 
can have a signiﬁ   cant impact on euro area 
conﬁ  dence indicators in the short term.39 Lastly, 
as regards inﬂ   ation, the crisis highlighted a 
dramatic change in the outlook linked to sharp 
ﬂ  uctuations in global commodity prices within 
the context of a rapidly changing environment 
for global and euro area growth. This would 
indicate that there is considerable merit in 
enhancing our understanding of global 
inﬂ   ationary developments. This particularly 
relates to global supply and demand imbalances 
and commodity price developments in the 
context of rapid changes in global economic 
activity. 
One particular aspect concerns trade. When global trade declined  38 
very sharply at the end of 2008, there was a marked decline in 
the volume of goods-in-transit (for instance, those subject to 
shipping). The consequences of this were similar to that of an 
inventory adjustment (which was also taking place at the time). 
Hence, a better understanding of the dynamics of trade ﬂ  ows is 
important, especially if such a situation were to arise once again 
in the future.
Dees and Soares Brinca (2011). 39 24
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5  WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD?
In the light of the preceding discussion, 
a number of key directions for future work 
can be emphasised. These include the need 
to: i) extend existing tools and develop new 
tools, where appropriate; ii) develop ways to 
better handle the complexity arising from more 
tools and models; and (iii) given the limited 
information of point forecasts, to further develop 
the analysis of risk and the measurement and 
assessment of forecast uncertainty. Certainly, 
such developments cannot be expected to 
eliminate forecast errors, particularly when 
economic conditions are extreme, but they 
should enhance our toolkit for interpreting and 
projecting economic developments as well as 
the related risks and, thereby, contribute to an 
enhancement of the overall economic analysis.
5.1  EXTEND EXISTING TOOLS AND DEVELOP 
NEW ONES
The need to take better account of the factors 
listed in Section 3 would imply putting an 
emphasis (where possible) on extending existing 
tools to reﬂ   ect such factors and, where such 
extensions are not possible, to develop new tools 
that better capture them. In the case of short-
term forecasting tools, models already exist that 
incorporate large information sets, including 
many of the ﬁ   nancial (e.g. spreads, asset 
prices, loans) and non-ﬁ  nancial (e.g. conﬁ  dence, 
trade spillovers) factors assessed to have been 
important during the crisis. Nonetheless, some 
efforts could be directed at extending the range 
of available information that is incorporated 
into the short-term assessment tools, including 
high-frequency information and that gleaned 
from non-ofﬁ  cial sources (e.g. such as Google 
Trends, automated teller machines and 
electricity consumption).40 Furthermore, new 
datasets linked to the Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey and the Survey of Access 
to Finance of SMEs can also be utilised.41 
Although such data sources are not very timely 
and hence cannot be used for conjunctural 
analysis, they may still help inform us about 
the key features and structures that might 
prove central to a proper understanding of 
developments during periods of economic and 
ﬁ  nancial instability.
A major additional challenge would appear to be 
to identify those economic variables, estimates 
and forecasts likely to be of most relevance at 
any given point in time. The development of 
reliable tools capturing possibly relevant non-
linearities and the prediction or identiﬁ  cation 
of turning points would also be particularly 
useful. With regard to larger scale models, there 
is a need to continue developing more realistic 
models, especially as concerns the treatment of 
ﬁ  nancial frictions and modelling of expectations 
formation. 
5.2  DEVELOP WAYS TO BETTER HANDLE 
COMPLEXITY 
While the crisis has certainly provided much 
impetus to the development of new tools and the 
extension of existing ones along the lines noted 
above, a continuing challenge will be to expand 
models  both meaningfully and tractably.42 
In respect of this, it is unlikely to be feasible 
(e.g. due to data limitations) or optimal (e.g. due 
to the need to understand core model properties) 
to include all innovations in one all-encompassing 
model. This would suggest a need to further 
develop the existing “suite of models” approach, 
whereby the analysis embedded in a given 
workhorse model can be supplemented by 
insights from other models; ones which could 
be extended to incorporate additional relevant 
information or missing elements (e.g. ﬁ  nancial 
See, for instance, Varian and Choi (2009) on Google Trends.  40 
Esteves (2009) considers the usefulness of ATM and Point of 
Sale (POS) information in forecasting and ﬁ  nds some gains in 
the nowcasting of non-durable consumption in Portugal. Fenz 
and Schneider (2009) have also investigated the use of truck 
mileage data in Austria.
See “Survey Data on Household Finance and Consumption -  41 
Research Summary and Policy Use” in the Occasional Paper 
Series of the ECB (No 100, January 2009) and also the “Survey 
on the access to ﬁ  nance of small and medium-sized enterprises” 
(ECB website http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/
sme/html/index.en.html).
See Papademos (2010). In addition, Spaventa (2009) mentions  42 
the practical difﬁ  culties of expanding models to include plausible 
descriptions of the ﬁ  nancial sector as one of the explanations for 
the limited progress in this area.25
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5    WHAT IS THE 
WAY FORWARD? factors, conﬁ   dence and behavioural factors 
and non-linear dynamics). Consequently, an 
important strength of the suite of models 
approach is that it may help avoid a hierarchy 
of models that is inﬂ  exible and time-invariant 
and where one particular model, as a rule, is 
considered to be superior or more reliable than 
the others. Instead, this approach places more 
of an emphasis on model selection, allowing 
for the fact that models which appear central 
to the understanding of the macro economy 
during some periods may prove to be less 
relevant − or even irrelevant − during others 
(and vice versa).
The practical and conceptual limitations to the 
development of a single, all- encompassing 
model also highlight the potential value in the 
application of forecast combination techniques. 
Under forecast combination, the projections 
derived from different models or paradigms 
are averaged together in a manner which may 
improve the overall forecast performance. 
Combined forecasts may therefore help hedge 
against the possible poor performance of any 
individual forecasting model due to sudden 
changes in the economic environment. In this 
respect, combination methods that are able to 
identify and switch the focus to other possibly 
better performing models and indicators 
during periods of extreme volatility need to 
be built into the framework for the short-
term assessment. A key practical challenge 
is, however, the development of methods to 
identify in real time which models, forecasts 
or tools should receive the highest weight − 
certainly, no easy task.43
5.3  DEVELOP FURTHER THE RISK ANALYSIS 
The crisis has shown the need to look beyond 
point forecasts and pay more attention to 
risks.44 Moreover, the scope for improving 
point forecasts in real time is likely to be fairly 
limited – particularly during crisis episodes and 
around turning points. Therefore, the economic 
analysis should place a strong emphasis and 
priority on risk assessments around the baseline 
projections. 
In order to better understand risks, greater 
consideration needs to be given to the factors that 
might drive alternative scenarios as well as their 
likelihood. In this regard, there would be clear 
beneﬁ  ts in drawing on the increased monitoring 
of disequilibria and imbalances in euro area 
countries – for instance, those affecting public 
ﬁ   nances, asset markets, international trade 
and  ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows – when constructing risk 
scenarios that might involve a rapid correction 
of such imbalances. Such an emphasis on risk 
assessment may also call for the development 
of other qualitative and probabilistic indicators 
highlighting the likelihood of certain events 
(e.g. a “recession” or “deﬂ   ation”) or other 
information on forecast uncertainty that can be 
extracted from density forecasts (e.g. the spread 
or skew of the forecast distribution). 
More generally, it should be required that models 
and tools are able to provide measures of 
uncertainty along with their point forecasts.45 
Moreover, consistent with the suite of models 
approach, it may not be appropriate to rely on a 
single measure of uncertainty from any speciﬁ  c 
tool. Indeed, as with point forecasts, there may 
be signiﬁ   cant gains from combining the 
information on forecast uncertainty from 
competing density forecasts.46 An example of 
this can be seen in the aggregate uncertainty 
measure from the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters of the ECB discussed in Section 3. 
However, further efforts are needed to explore 
alternative ways to optimally combine competing 
models or expert assessments of uncertainty.
Recent research related to the SPF of the ECB by Genre,  43 
Kenny, Meyler and Timmermann (2010) has also pointed to 
potential gains from forecast combination (see also Kenny, 
2010). In particular, more optimal combination weights yield 
improvements in forecast performance for GDP (both on average 
and for the period of crisis).
The tendency to underestimate risk was powerfully emphasised  44 
in the book by Taleb (2007) which was written just before the 
onset of the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis.
As, for instance, in the Bayesian VAR tool for short-term  45 
inﬂ   ation forecasting of Giannone, Lenza, Momferatou, and 
Onorante (2010).
For instance, a combination of Gaussian densities will tend  46 
to exhibit non-Gaussian features such as skewness and fat 
tails. Such combinations may therefore better approximate 
underlying uncertainty if the “true” density is non-Gaussian. 
See, for example, Hall and Mitchell (2007).26
ECB
Occasional Paper No 130
October 2011
6 CONCLUSIONS
The economics profession in general, and 
economic forecasters in particular, have faced 
some understandable criticism for their failure 
to predict the timing and severity of the recent 
economic crisis. Although many pointed to the 
emergence of economic imbalances, the speed 
and depth of the recession were still a major 
shock to most, if not all, economists. As we have 
documented, this can be seen in the widespread 
failure to anticipate the large decline in GDP 
that occurred in late 2008 and early 2009, 
or even to diagnose such developments correctly 
at the time that they were taking place. 
Various macroeconomic models and tools 
can offer plausible explanations for economic 
developments during the crisis, which is 
certainly helpful for our understanding of this 
period. However, as an input into forward-
looking policy deliberations, economic analysis 
must strive to provide more than reasonable ex 
post assessments of such crises and to develop 
tools that can also help inform us ex ante. 
In this context, we have argued that there is 
a need to develop tools which take greater 
account of ﬁ  nancial factors and also to develop 
and explore the usefulness of non-linear models. 
While it may well be the case that ﬁ  nancial 
factors and non-linear behaviour may not be 
important in “normal” times, it is essential that 
such models are part of the available “toolkit” 
or “suite of models”. Forecasters must then use 
their judgement or other model selection criteria 
to assess which model or tool is likely to be 
the most relevant at any speciﬁ  c point in time. 
To supplement this judgement, particularly 
in situations when model uncertainty is high, 
further emphasis could also be placed on 
developing ways to optimally combine diverse 
forecasts from differing tools.
Some more general lessons, which would also 
apply in normal times, would seem to be the need 
to take greater account of international linkages 
and to broaden the range of information that 
is analysed. As regards international linkages, 
it is clearly necessary to look beyond the trade 
channel and to examine the transmission of both 
ﬁ   nancial and conﬁ   dence shocks. As regards 
information, there is a need to extend the focus 
of short-term assessment tools and to ﬁ  nd ways 
to include very high frequency information and 
information gleaned from non-ofﬁ  cial sources. 
Finally, the crisis has shown the necessity of 
looking beyond point forecasts and giving 
greater consideration to risk.
What has been proposed above would appear to 
offer a promising but challenging agenda for 
professional economists in the coming years. 
However, while there seems to be some prospect 
of progress, it is likely that macroeconomic 
forecasters will continue to make signiﬁ  cant 
forecast errors in the years ahead. Predicting the 
timing of crises which may be linked to the 
bursting of asset price bubbles or the rapid 
correction of imbalances accumulated over a 
number of years is an inherently difﬁ  cult – if not 
impossible – task.47 Nevertheless, by considering 
such factors and the risks of alternative 
scenarios, the economic analysis can at the very 
least aim to provide more useful information to 
policy-makers.
See, for instance, the recent work by Harding and Pagan (2010)  47 
on predicting recessions.27
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